Verlagslink DOI: 10.1145/3646547.3688451
10.48550/arXiv.2410.11708
Titel: The age of DDoScovery : an empirical comparison of industry and academic DDoS assessments
Sprache: Englisch
Autorenschaft: Hiesgen, Raphael 
Nawrocki, Marcin 
Barcellos, Marinho 
Kopp, Daniel 
Hohlfeld, Oliver 
Chan, Echo 
Dobbins, Roland 
Doerr, Christian 
Rossow, Christian 
Thomas, Daniel R. 
Jonker, Mattijs 
Mok, Ricky 
Luo, Xiapu 
Kristoff, John 
Schmidt, Thomas C.  
Wählisch, Matthias 
Claffy, KC 
Schlagwörter: Internet Security; Internet Measurement; DDoS
Erscheinungsdatum: 4-Nov-2024
Verlag: Association for Computing Machinery
Buchtitel: Proceedings of the 2024 ACM on Internet Measurement Conference
Teil der Schriftenreihe: ACM Conferences 
Anfangsseite: 259
Endseite: 279
Konferenz: ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2024 
Zusammenfassung: 
Motivated by the impressive but diffuse scope of DDoS research and reporting, we undertake a multistakeholder (joint industry-academic) analysis to seek convergence across the best available macroscopic views of the relative trends in two dominant classes of attacks – direct-path attacks and reflection-amplification attacks. We first analyze 24 industry reports to extract trends and (in)consistencies across observations by commercial stakeholders in 2022. We then analyze nine data sets spanning industry and academic sources, across four years (2019-2023), to find and explain discrepancies based on data sources, vantage points, methods, and parameters. Our method includes a new approach: we share an aggregated list of DDoS targets with industry players who return the results of joining this list with their proprietary data sources to reveal gaps in visibility of the academic data sources. We use academic data sources to explore an industry-reported relative drop in spoofed reflection-amplification attacks in 2021-2022. Our study illustrates the value, but also the challenge, in independent validation of security-related properties of Internet infrastructure. Finally, we reflect on opportunities to facilitate greater common understanding of the DDoS landscape. We hope our results inform not only future academic and industry pursuits but also emerging policy efforts to reduce systemic Internet security vulnerabilities.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12738/19117
ISBN: 979-8-4007-0592-2
Begutachtungsstatus: Diese Version hat ein Peer-Review-Verfahren durchlaufen (Peer Review)
Einrichtung: Department Informatik (ehemalig, aufgelöst 10.2025) 
Fakultät Technik und Informatik (ehemalig, aufgelöst 10.2025) 
Dokumenttyp: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Hinweise zur Quelle: Preprint: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2410.11708. Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1145%2F3646547.3688451.
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Diese Ressource wurde unter folgender Copyright-Bestimmung veröffentlicht: Lizenz von Creative Commons Creative Commons