| Verlagslink DOI: | 10.1145/3646547.3688451 10.48550/arXiv.2410.11708 |
Titel: | The age of DDoScovery : an empirical comparison of industry and academic DDoS assessments | Sprache: | Englisch | Autorenschaft: | Hiesgen, Raphael Nawrocki, Marcin Barcellos, Marinho Kopp, Daniel Hohlfeld, Oliver Chan, Echo Dobbins, Roland Doerr, Christian Rossow, Christian Thomas, Daniel R. Jonker, Mattijs Mok, Ricky Luo, Xiapu Kristoff, John Schmidt, Thomas C. Wählisch, Matthias Claffy, KC |
Schlagwörter: | Internet Security; Internet Measurement; DDoS | Erscheinungsdatum: | 4-Nov-2024 | Verlag: | Association for Computing Machinery | Buchtitel: | Proceedings of the 2024 ACM on Internet Measurement Conference | Teil der Schriftenreihe: | ACM Conferences | Anfangsseite: | 259 | Endseite: | 279 | Konferenz: | ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2024 | Zusammenfassung: | Motivated by the impressive but diffuse scope of DDoS research and reporting, we undertake a multistakeholder (joint industry-academic) analysis to seek convergence across the best available macroscopic views of the relative trends in two dominant classes of attacks – direct-path attacks and reflection-amplification attacks. We first analyze 24 industry reports to extract trends and (in)consistencies across observations by commercial stakeholders in 2022. We then analyze nine data sets spanning industry and academic sources, across four years (2019-2023), to find and explain discrepancies based on data sources, vantage points, methods, and parameters. Our method includes a new approach: we share an aggregated list of DDoS targets with industry players who return the results of joining this list with their proprietary data sources to reveal gaps in visibility of the academic data sources. We use academic data sources to explore an industry-reported relative drop in spoofed reflection-amplification attacks in 2021-2022. Our study illustrates the value, but also the challenge, in independent validation of security-related properties of Internet infrastructure. Finally, we reflect on opportunities to facilitate greater common understanding of the DDoS landscape. We hope our results inform not only future academic and industry pursuits but also emerging policy efforts to reduce systemic Internet security vulnerabilities. |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12738/19117 | ISBN: | 979-8-4007-0592-2 | Begutachtungsstatus: | Diese Version hat ein Peer-Review-Verfahren durchlaufen (Peer Review) | Einrichtung: | Department Informatik (ehemalig, aufgelöst 10.2025) Fakultät Technik und Informatik (ehemalig, aufgelöst 10.2025) |
Dokumenttyp: | Konferenzveröffentlichung | Hinweise zur Quelle: | Preprint: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2410.11708. Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1145%2F3646547.3688451. |
| Enthalten in den Sammlungen: | Publications without full text |
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