Empirical design patterns for resilience : reducing cognitive overload and UI manipulation in digital grid control centers

Abstract

Network control centers are central nodes for the robustness of modern power systems. Particularly in the context of emerging low-voltage (LV) control centers that process decentralized data streams, human-computer interaction (HCI) represents a systemic security vulnerability. While cybersecurity efforts have traditionally focused on technical defenses, deficiencies in the design of user interfaces (UI) create critical security gaps for operational disruptions and targeted UI-based manipulation through cognitive overload and routine blind spots. This study uses a design science research (DSR) methodology (expert interviews N=2, expert workshop N=9) to empirically investigate this domain-specific user experience (UX) security vulnerability. Three structural, domain-specific UX security clusters are identified: (1) cognitive overload due to system complexity, (2) operational incongruity and routine blindness, and (3) abstraction gaps and UI manipulation. Building on these empirical fi ndings, three evidence-based design patterns (context-aware display, anti-habituation feedback, forensic traceability) were developed in a high-fidelity prototype for LV control centers. This work identifies three domain-specific UX-security vulnerabilities in grid control interfaces and derives empirically grounded design patterns to address them. The resulting high-fidelity prototype provides a concrete instantiation of security-aware UX principles, ready for empirical validation through planned A/B testing.